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ARE FISCAL ADJUSTMENTS LESS SUCCESSFUL 





A common political claim is that decentralized governments undermine policy makers’ ability 
to fight fiscal imbalance. This paper examines how different fiscal institutions influence the 
likelihood of a successful fiscal adjustment. Using a panel of the Swiss cantons from 1981 to 
2001, we first analyze the episodes of tight fiscal policy and their macroeconomic 
consequences. Then, we empirically investigate the determinants of successful long-lasting 
deficit reductions. Contrary to the popular claim, we find that fiscal decentralization increases 
the probability of a successful fiscal consolidation. In addition, the results point to an 
important role of intergovernmental grants and the circumstances, in particular the size of 
fiscal imbalance in the years before the consolidation in determining a successful adjustment 
policy. Furthermore, coalition governments and large parliaments less likely implement 
successful fiscal stabilizations. Finally, there is some weak evidence that spending cuts are 
more promising in reaching a long-lasting fiscal adjustment than revenue increases. 
JEL Code: E61, E63, H61. 
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1.  Introduction 
The possibility that fiscal policy decisions in a democracy are biased towards deficit finance and 
excessive spending with targeted benefits and diverse costs has been recognized at least since the 
studies by Buchanan and Wagner (1977) or Weingast, Shepsle and Johnson (1981).
1 In order to 
tackle problems of mounting public deficits created by an “unsustainable” fiscal policy in the 
1970s and 1980s many governments have implemented statutory limitations to balance their 
budgets (Poterba, 1997). As has been shown by different authors, such balanced-budget require-
ments may be an effective instrument in reducing fiscal imbalance if adequately designed (Shad-
begian, 1999; Poterba, 1996; Bohn and Inman, 1996, Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1995).
2  
In order to comply with these balanced budget rules, many governments have started implement-
ing fiscal consolidation policies. Substantial research efforts have been focused on the macro-
economic effects to these fiscal adjustments as well as on identifying those determinants that 
favor long-lasting and sustainable consolidations.
3 In a pioneering work, Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1990) study two major fiscal contractions in Denmark (1983-1986) and in Ireland (1987-1989) 
that were associated with surprising, immediate non-Keynesian expansionary economic effects. 
The explanation brought up by the two authors (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1996) as well as by Ber-
tola and Drazen (1993) is that the wealth effect by a credibly announced long-lasting spending 
cut leads to higher consumption today and offsets the Keynesian recessive impact of reduced 
                                                  
1   More recently, Alesina and Perotti (1995) discuss different politico-institutional explanations why some govern-
ments accumulated large and persistent debt while others did not. 
2   However, von Hagen (1991) presents evidence that balanced budget rules on the US state level mainly shifted 
government debt from full faith and credit to other debt that is not fully backed by the state but did not have a 
significant effect on the overall level of indebtedness. 
3   In the literature on the political economy of reform some authors argue that the severity of a crisis is an impor-
tant aspect in successfully implementing reform policies (Krueger, 1993 or Williamson, 1994). However, as 
Rodrik (1996) states, the argument, that a crisis causes reform, is not free of tautology. Reform is only a political 
issue when actual policies are perceived not to be working. Thus, the emphasis on crisis may not be a good ex-
planation as to what form of adjustment will be taken.  
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public spending (the expectation view). According to that argument, the size of the fiscal con-
traction is decisive for causing expansionary effects as it signals a credible policy change, 
whereas only small adjustments fail to persuade consumers to anticipate their consumption to a 
higher income level. In fact, Sutherland (1997) and Zaghini (2001) provide evidence that size-
able adjustment policies are changing expectations on future tax liabilities and consequently 
boost aggregate demand immediately, especially in periods of fiscal stress, where a consolidation 
of the unsustainable path of fiscal policy is to be expected sooner or later.
4  
In an extension to the literature Alesina and Perotti (1997) and Alesina and Ardagna (1998) pro-
vide an explanation for a successful fiscal stabilization due to labor market effects affecting the 
cost of firms (the labor market view or composition view). They show that expansionary fiscal 
consolidation is more likely and sustainable if relying primarily on spending cuts. Even in the 
case where the adjustment is of the same size in terms of reducing the primary budget deficit, 
cutting back spending induces a more promising consolidation than tax increases. In addition, 
they argue that the composition of spending cuts matters. Particularly successful deficit-to-GDP 
and debt-to-GDP reductions are associated with cuts on government transfers, welfare spending 
and government wages. However, if the budget consolidation relies on reductions of public in-
vestment, the adjustments tend to be unsuccessful.  
Recently, Ardagna (2004) evaluated the relative importance of the two basic views of non-
Keynesian effects of consolidation. She provides evidence that the composition of stabilization 
policy matters for economic growth mainly via the labor market effect induced by moderate 
wage agreements. The size of the fiscal contraction is key when it comes to fight rising debt. 
                                                  
4   Perotti (1999) reports empirical evidence that deficit cuts are particularly expansionary when public debt is high.  
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Ardagna’s empirical findings indicate that, when governments engage in sizeable fiscal adjust-
ments, the probability of success in the sense of a long-lasting debt reduction almost doubles.  
While much research effort has subsequently been devoted to the question of which policy meas-
ure is particularly apt to support a successful fiscal consolidation and to the macroeconomic con-
sequences of fiscal adjustments, the politico-institutional aspect of fiscal adjustments is much 
less elaborated. Does the institutional framework in which the fiscal stabilization has to be ap-
proved play a decisive role? A common claim by political leaders is, that austere fiscal adjust-
ments are difficult to achieve in a decentralized government even if seen as necessary by most 
interest groups since too many veto-players can delay policy decisions. We argue that fiscal de-
centralization does not necessarily delay successful fiscal adjustments since it fosters fiscal dis-
cipline and the accountability of incumbents’ spending and revenue decisions. In contrast, our 
empirical results indicate that a decentralized government may be more successful in implement-
ing fiscal stabilization than a centralized government.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. First we review the literature on the impact of fiscal 
institutions on fiscal adjustments. Then, we concentrate on episodes of fiscal adjustments in 
Switzerland and present some macroeconomic effects of fiscal adjustments while section five is 
concerned with the empirical analysis of the determinants of successful fiscal adjustments. Fi-
nally, section six concludes.  
2.  Fiscal adjustments and fiscal institutions 
Several authors have analyzed the political economy of fiscal adjustments, but mostly without 
referring to particular institutional frameworks. Alesina and Drazen (1991), for example, devel-
oped a “war-of-attrition” model of delayed stabilizations as a result of too many parties in gov-
ernment that render it difficult to reach a consensus on concrete adjustment policies. In a society   – 5 –
in which resources are unevenly distributed, the delay before stabilization will take place in-
creases because interest groups believe that the burden of the adjustment policy will be one-
sided. The more groups are represented in government, the more probable is opposition to a con-
solidation process. In fact, Spolaore (1993) and Tavares (2004) present empirical evidence that 
broad-based coalition governments have more difficulties in committing to a stabilization pro-
gram than majority governments. Mierau, Jon-A-Pin and de Haan (2005) report results that a 
higher number of political parties in coalition governments reduce the likelihood that a gradual 
adjustment process occurs.  
Another political economy aspect is analyzed by Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998): a change 
in government and the popularity of the government. In their empirical study, re-election pros-
pects of governments that follow a tight fiscal policy are evaluated. According to their findings, 
governments are not more frequently replaced after deficit cuts during a phase of fiscal stabiliza-
tion. That means that loose fiscal discipline does not necessarily contribute to government sur-
vival. Since politicians are concerned about the popularity of their policies, the authors further 
examine the effect of deficit changes on the change of government’s popularity. Again, the re-
sults indicate that government popularity is not systematically affected by tight adjustment poli-
cies. The findings by Mierau, Jon-A-Pin and de Haan (2005) that the chance for rapid fiscal ad-
justment is negatively influenced by upcoming elections do however not support this hypothesis.  
A third source of political economy influence on the likelihood of fiscal adjustments comes from 
partisan models. Mierau, Jon-A-Pin and de Haan (2005) report empirical evidence that fiscal 
adjustments occur more likely under right-wing than under left-wing governments. Tavares 
(2004) also presents evidence that party ideologies play a role in fiscal adjustments. Govern-
ments can signal commitment to a consolidation policy by choosing those stabilization instru-  – 6 –
ments that are not favored by the own constituency. That is, persistent fiscal adjustments intro-
duced by left-wing cabinets are achieved by spending cuts. Right-wing cabinets, on the other 
hand, have to realize tax revenue increases for signaling credibility in their adjustment policy.  
In none of these studies, institutional particularities play a role. In the respective models, gov-
ernments consolidate public finances by uniform decision-making. Divided government, which 
may be achieved by any form of horizontal or vertical checks and balances, is not explicitly ana-
lyzed. An important institutional feature of a divided government is federalism or, more exactly, 
the degree of fiscal decentralization between the different layers of government. Though there is 
a lot of evidence that fiscal decentralization matters for the size of government (for a survey see 
Feld, Kirchgässner and Schaltegger, 2004), for economic performance (Thiessen, 2003), or for 
fiscal discipline (Rodden, 2002), there is no empirical evidence on the effect of decentralization 
on the persistence of fiscal adjustments up to now. Does a country’s structure of the state also 
have an influence on the probability of successful fiscal consolidation?  
In the political science literature, this question is discussed under the catchword “decisiveness” 
of a political system (Cox and McCubbins, 2001).
5 A common political claim is that fiscal de-
centralization reduces the ability of political leaders to implement austere fiscal adjustments. It is 
argued that more policy discretion enables governments to undertake those political reforms that 
are strongly needed, but are not very popular. One argument why consolidations may be delayed 
under fiscal decentralization points to the number of veto players in the political system. Accord-
ing to Tsebelis (1995) or Tsebelis and Chang (2001), veto players are individuals or institutions 
whose agreement is necessary to change the status quo. Arguably the likelihood of a successful 
fiscal adjustment decreases with the number of veto players.    – 7 –
Transferred to our case of fiscal federalism, the argument is that decentralized decision-making 
procedures increase the number of veto-players – policy-makers whose agreement for a policy 
change is necessary. Three different ways of obstructing fiscal consolidation in a federation are 
particularly important. First, many federations adopt a two-chamber system of parliament in 
which one chamber represents the states, cantons, provinces, Laender or regions. If the consent 
of the second chamber of government is necessary for fiscal consolidation, a veto position of the 
sub-federal jurisdictions is formally established and the fiscal consolidation becomes more diffi-
cult in a federation. The concrete institutional arrangement of the two-chamber legislature plays 
an important role however. In the German case, for example, the second chamber is not directly 
elected, but is comprised of the prime ministers of the different Laender. In this case, the support 
of the Laender governments is needed for fiscal consolidation. This support does not only de-
pend on the interest of each Land, but also on partisan considerations and whether the federal 
government is from the same party or has the same ideological orientation. In the U.S. (and the 
Swiss) case, the senators are directly elected in their respective states and have incentives to 
minimize the contribution of their state in a fiscal consolidation process. They are however less 
concerned by partisan considerations, have no interest in the situation of the respective state gov-
ernments and are also interested in the fiscal position of the federal level. 
Second, even without considering the representation of states at the federal level, the states can 
counteract fiscal consolidation procedures whenever there is an established fiscal relationship 
between the federal and the state level. For example, the state and the federal revenue share of 
revenue from joint taxation systems may be an important parameter of interest in consolidation 
procedures. The federal level often finances particular spending programs at the state level and 
                                                                                                                                                           
5   Cox and McCubbins (2001) define decisiveness of a political system as “the ability of a state to enact and imple-
ment policy change.”   – 8 –
so on. In these cases, a comprehensive consolidation effort that touches upon these fiscal rela-
tionships between the center and the states needs support by the states. Third, even if the federal 
government is not restricted by the explicit requirement of consent with a majority of states, an 
autonomous federal fiscal consolidation can be counteracted by the states. After a successful 
fiscal consolidation, the federal government has the ability to provide additional support to the 
states for example in a fiscal equalization system. If the federal government consolidates, the 
states have an incentive to spend additionally and incur additional debt in order to be bailed-out 
by the federal government in the future (Goodspeed 2002, Feld and Goodspeed 2005). The fol-
lowing state over-spending reduces the effectiveness of federal fiscal consolidations. The incen-
tives for over-spending are the stronger, the higher the fiscal transfers between jurisdictions are. 
Thus, with increasing decentralization and fragmentation of political competencies in a country, 
the feasibility of a fiscal stabilization reform runs off since it becomes ever harder to find a con-
sensus on the reform measures. Moreover, various institutional arrangements between the upper-
level and the lower-level governments and between the jurisdictions on the same level of gov-
ernment create political inter-dependencies. Scharpf et al. (1976) and Scharpf (1994), on the ba-
sis of the German example, claim that decentralization causes deadlocks in the political system 
from several complexities between different political entities that evolve over time. Such inter-
dependencies between governments may be an important reason for delayed stabilization efforts.  
In fact, some case studies have argued that government decentralization may even be dangerous 
when fiscal consolidation is needed. Good politics is viewed to require “strong” and “autono-
mous” leadership (Siebert (2005) for the case of Germany; Pinera (1994) for the case of Chile; 
Rentsch et al. (2004) for the case of Switzerland). In other words, this approach counts on coura-
geous political leaders implementing austere budget policies. In search of such “heroes of the   – 9 –
economics profession”, one has to strengthen leadership and consequently empower political 
leaders with those policy instruments that are required to implement adequate reforms. Regarding 
New Zealand, Wallis (1999) reports how a “conspiratorial” network works towards coherent pol-
icy leadership characterized by its commitment to advance a consistent set of policy principles. 
An illustrative quote is a dictum by the former prime minister of Portugal, Mario Soares, who 
declared: “This government will be austere, uncompromising, and unpopular if that is what is 
required to achieve economic recovery” (Rodrik 1996, p. 9.). However, as Rodrik (1996) puts it, 
it is puzzling to believe that reforms aiming to make people better off should be shielded from the 
people’s influence. If reforms are beneficial for the people as a whole, it will be possible to com-
pensate powerful interest groups, which are hurt by the reform policy. According to Fernandez 
and Rodrik (1991), an explanation why governments fail to adopt reform policies is because of 
difficulties in identifying some of the individual gainers and losers from the reform beforehand.  
On the other hand, decentralization may foster fiscal discipline if the fiscal responsibilities for 
each government level in a federation are clearly and transparently assigned, as Rodden (2002) 
and many other authors argue. The resulting fiscal competition accompanied by an absence of 
bail-out provisions will force governments to follow sound fiscal policies. Also, time inconsis-
tency is a minor problem in a system with well established checks and balances: the credibility 
and accountability, that ex ante announced reform policies will not be quickly revised ex post, is 
much higher in a stable institutional framework (Pitlik, 2004). It is hard to believe that decen-
tralization should delay or even prevent successful fiscal adjustments then. Fiscal decentraliza-
tion may work as a commitment device to ensure that mutually agreed stabilization policies will 
eventually stay enacted over quite some time. Contrary, centralist decisions-making institutions 
that enable political leaders with policy discretion cannot credibly guarantee the sustainability of   – 10 –
stabilization reforms for more than a gubernatorial term. According to Crepaz (1996) or Stiglitz 
(1998) mutually accepted agreements on fiscal adjustments are more likely to be successful since 
the process by which the decision has been made is seen to be fair so that even “losers” of the 
fiscal stabilization policy feel committed to the reform.  
3.  Episodes of fiscal adjustments in Switzerland: definitions, sample and basic statistics 
We now have a closer look at the episodes of fiscal adjustment in Switzerland. Our sample cov-
ers all Swiss cantons between 1981 and 2001. Fiscal data are from the Swiss Federal Finance 
Department for all cantons. As we are interested in discretionary changes of cantonal fiscal pol-
icy decisions, we need to distinguish budget deficits from interest payments that cannot be con-
sidered as exogenous policy actions undertaken by the government. Thus, we remove the com-
ponent of the government balance that purely results from business cycles.  
Figure 1 shows the development of public debts in Swiss cantons from 1981 to 2001.  

























Next, as we focus on episodes of very tight fiscal policy, we consider only relatively large fiscal 
adjustments according to the following definition:    – 11 –
Definition 1: A period of fiscal adjustment is defined as a year in which the 
primary balance per GDP of a canton improves by at least 1 percentage 
point, or a period of two consecutive years in which the primary balance 
improves by at least 0.8 percentage points in each year.  
Setting this rather demanding threshold, we identify only very tight adjustments that clearly rep-
resent a discretionary change in the fiscal stance. According to this definition, for the 1981-2001 
period, Switzerland witnessed 62 tight fiscal adjustments. As Table 1 indicates, the deficit reduc-
tion is distributed according to a ratio of 1 to 2 between lower spending and higher revenues. It is 
somewhat surprising that tight fiscal policies are relying more on revenue increases than on 
spending cuts since it stands in stark contrast to the results for OECD countries (Alesina and 
Perotti, 1997). However, since the specific design of the distribution formula of intergovernmen-
tal grants in Switzerland rewards high tax burdens with a high share of granted transfers, the re-
sult is absolutely plausible (Schaltegger and Frey, 2003). It reflects the poor design of the trans-
fer scheme, which eventually is to be changed in 2008.  
Table 1: Fiscal Adjustments in Swiss Cantons: Changes in Primary Spending and Revenues (in 
percentage points of GDP) 
 Number  of 
Observations 
Fiscal Impulse  Change in Primary 
Spending 
Change in Revenues 














Difference   1.59  0.72***  0.87*** 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate that the difference between the two averages is 
statistically significant at the level of less than 1%, between 1 and 5%, and between 5 and 10%, respectively.  
Having identified the sample of tight fiscal policies, the next step is to assess which of them were 
successfully. The identification of tight fiscal policy allows us to analyze the success of the fiscal 
retrenchment according to the following definition:   – 12 –
Definition 2: A period of fiscal adjustment is considered to have been suc-
cessful, if in the three years after the adjustment, the primary balance im-
proved on average by at least half a percentage point.  
Table 2 summarizes the episodes of successful fiscal adjustments in Switzerland. 17 cases of 
successful fiscal adjustment could be identified. Most successful consolidations fall on the sec-
ond part of our period of observation. On average the improvement of the primary balance ac-
counts for 1.60 percentage points as can be seen by Table 1.  
Table 2: Episodes of Successful Fiscal Adjustments in Switzerland 
Canton  Year (Improvement of Primary Balance in Percentage Points of GDP) 
Uri 1999  (2.06) 
Schwyz  1982 (1.26), 1993 (1.20) 
Obwalden 1998  (1.39) 
Nidwalden 1999  (1.42) 
Zug  1994 – 1995 (1.07), 1995 (1.22) 
Solothurn 1999  (2.38) 
Appenzell a.Rh.  1983 (1.76), 1993 (1.55) 
Appenzell i.Rh.  1983 (1.53), 1992 (1.47) 
Ticino  1984 (1.04), 1998 (1.00) 
Neuchâtel 1993  (1.35) 
Genève 1998  (1.06) 
Jura 1995  (2.06) 
In Table 3 we display the magnitude and the composition of the 62 tight fiscal periods divided 
into successful and unsuccessful consolidations. The difference of the two groups of fiscal ad-
justments concerns the magnitude and the significance of the change. First, the magnitude of the 
primary deficit reduction is significantly higher in the unsuccessful cases (-1.66) compared to 
successful adjustments (-1.45) which somewhat contradicts the “expectation view” in fiscal ad-
justment. Second, the improvement of the primary balance is based more heavily on revenue 
increases in unsuccessful (1.19) than in successful (0.98) consolidations. However, the difference 
is not significant. Despite the fact that the intergovernmental transfer scheme rewards tax in-  – 13 –
creases, it seems that long-lasting deficit reductions rely slightly less on revenue-based adjust-
ments than unsuccessful adjustments. This result is in line with the “labor-market view” or the 
“composition view” of fiscal adjustments. Most interestingly, successful consolidations are ac-
companied by reductions in received federal grants while unsuccessful adjustments have per-
ceived a rise in transfer payments by the federal government.  
Table 3: Successful and Unsuccessful Fiscal Adjustments in Swiss Cantons: Changes in Primary 
Spending and Revenues (in percentage points of GDP) 








Change in  
Revenues 
 
Change in Received 
Intergovernmental 
Transfers 





















Difference   0.11**  0.00  0.21  0.06* 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate that the difference between the two averages is 
statistically significant at the level of less than 1%, between 1 and 5%, and between 5 and 10%, respectively.  
In Table 4, we show some macroeconomic results for the successful and the unsuccessful ad-
justments. The results report average values for the two years before the adjustment, during a 
significant fiscal action and the two years following the last year of the consolidation.  
The difference in the macroeconomic effects before, during and in the aftermath between suc-
cessful and unsuccessful fiscal adjustments is striking. First, successful adjustments occur in 
periods when the economic situation is much worse than in the unsuccessful cases. However, 
during successful consolidations the rate of GDP-growth increases by 0.5 percentage points, ris-
ing to over 2.4 percentage points including the two-year period after the stabilization. On the 
contrary, during and two years after the unsuccessful episodes economic growth is increasing 
much more moderate. Additionally, the data suggest that adjustments are not successful simply 
because they were implemented in periods of high growth. In fact, during the implementation   – 14 –
phase of a successful consolidation economic growth was negative. Referring to the literature on 
“Keynesian versus Non-Keynesian-Effects” of fiscal adjustments, our data favor the latter view 
on the expansionary effect of fiscal consolidations for the Swiss case. After a successful fiscal 
consolidation, GDP growth boosts significantly and much more than in the unsuccessful cases.  
Table 4: Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Stabilizations (in percentage points of GDP) 
































































































































Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate that the difference between the two averages is 
statistically significant at the level of less than 1%, between 1 and 5%, and between 5 and 10%, respectively.  
A similar pattern is obviously given by the fiscal stance. When the fiscal situation is bad in terms 
of rising debt levels, the success of an adjustment policy is more likely than in cases where fiscal 
conditions are less alarming. Moreover, successful adjustments face a significant reduction of 
debt levels whereas the debt reduction is more moderate and insignificant in the case of unsuc-
cessful adjustments. When comparing the patterns of primary spending growth, an interesting 
observation emerges, too. Successful fiscal consolidations are associated with significant and 
sustainable long-lasting spending cuts while unsuccessful stabilizations perceive a renewed 
spending boost after a first success in cutting back public expenditures. In the case of public   – 15 –
revenues, both successful as well as unsuccessful adjustment policies do not increase their reve-
nue capacity during or after the adjustment significantly. Turning to transfers, it is interesting to 
notice that successful adjustments did not receive significantly additional revenues due to an 
increase of financial aid by the federal government. Next, successful adjustments experience 
only slightly and insignificant more investment in their economy after the consolidation. Finally, 
interesting differences on the labor market can be observed. A successful fiscal adjustment is 
accompanied by a more sizeable and significant reduction of the rate of unemployment.  
Summing up, we can conclude, first, that successful consolidations occur in periods of economic 
and fiscal stress in terms of negative GDP growth, and rising debt. While this result is in line 
with the popular notion that governments have to be up against the wall before they act, the ar-
gumentation is not entirely free from tautology. Fiscal adjustments become naturally a political 
issue only when current policies do not seem to work. Second, successful fiscal adjustments 
show long-lasting and relatively sharper spending cuts than unsuccessful stabilizations. Third, 
both successful and unsuccessful consolidations experience revenue increases but in the former 
case, the share of federal aid on these revenues was slightly reduced during the consolidation 
implementation compared to unsuccessful adjustments with an increasing share of federal aid.  
4.  Empirical analysis on the probability of a successful fiscal adjustment 
In this section, our aim is to empirically analyze whether institutional features of a government 
significantly affect the likelihood of success in consolidation policies. If the two conditions of 
definition 1 and 2 hold, we assume that a government has undertaken a discretionary cut in the 
deficit-to-GDP ratio and succeeded in its long-lasting reduction. Thus, we are concerned with 
large and persistent reductions of government deficits resulting from discretionary budget im-
provements rather than with small and continuous fiscal changes in the budget.    – 16 –
We estimate a Probit model to assess the impact of fiscal decentralization on the fiscal consolida-
tion controlling for various independent variables which have been proven to be important ex-
planations of fiscal stabilizations in the literature (see Appendix A for an exact description and 
Appendix for descriptive statistics of the variables). The dependent variable takes the value 1 if 
the adjustment is successful and 0 otherwise. As Ardagna (2004) has pointed out, the appropriate 
sample of country (state)-years that should be included in the empirical estimate can be debate. 
We follow Ardagna (2004) including all observations in which there is a “need” for fiscal stabi-
lization instead of only considering those years in which we observe a large fiscal contraction.
6 
Since there is no common definition when there is a “need” of fiscal austerity, we cannot distin-
guish between cases, for which we observe no successful adjustment because there was no need 
for government action, and those cases, for which stabilization would have been appropriate but 
the government didn’t act. Thus, the disadvantage of our procedure including all observations of 
the whole sample is that we also consider times when there was no concern of fiscal stabiliza-
tion. This may result in a downward-bias of the coefficient of successful stabilizations (note 6). 
The advantage of our procedure is that we do not lose the information from those episodes when 
fiscal stabilization was not carried out despite of problems of fiscal discipline. Figure 1 supports 
our empirical procedure as debt-to-GDP levels of Swiss cantons soared after 1990 while state 
governments reduced debt in the 1980s after the first oil price shock (for longer time-series see 
Kirchgässner, 2004). Thus, fiscal discipline was recognized as a problem during the first oil cri-
ses and became a major political issue in Swiss cantons after 1990.  
                                                  
6  However, we also estimated regressions with a data sample only covering periods of tight fiscal policies (62 
periods). The qualitative results (significance of the coefficients) are similar to those reported in Table 5 even 
though the size of the coefficients is much stronger for the small sample. Results are available upon request.    – 17 –
Table 5: Likelihood of successful fiscal adjustment. Probit estimates for Swiss cantons 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (10) 
ΔGDP (t-1)  -0.196*  -0.234** -0.164** -0.033 -0.028*  -0.035*  -0.032* 
 (-1.85)  (-2.46)  (-2.00)  (-1.37)  (-1.70)  (-1.87)  (-1.91) 
ΔGDP Switzerland (t-1)    0.095        0.019  0.018 
   (0.63)        (0.62)  (0.63) 
Primary balance (t-1)  -0.702***  -0.726*** -0.612*** -0.222*** -0.156***  -0.161***  -0.149***
 (-2.92)  (-2.84)  (-3.39)  (-3.39)  (-3.18)  (-3.02)  (-3.06) 
Debt (t-1)  0.038  0.036  0.016 0.020**  0.014**  0.014**  0.013** 
 (1.16)  (1.09)  (0.62)  (2.45)  (2.37)  (2.39)  (2.15) 
Δprimary spending  -0.388*  -0.389*  -0.320* -0.080  -0.049  -0.047  -0.042 
 (-1.85)  (-1.95)  (-1.97)  (-1.43)  (-1.32)  (-1.30)  (-1.25) 
Δtax revenues  0.231  0.223  0.188 0.109  0.073  0.070  0.064 
 (0.72)  (0.71)  (0.70)  (1.30)  (1.27)  (1.19)  (1.17) 
Δtransfers -0.767*  -0.822  -0.711*    -0.160**  -0.170**  -0.158** 
  (-1.67)  (-1.64) (-1.93)    (-2.15) (-2.02)  (-1.99) 
Government centralization       -0.033***  -0.023***  -0.023***  -0.021***
       (-3.89) (-3.93)  (-3.93)  (-3.95) 
Fiscal referendum        -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001 
       (-1.17) (-1.47)  (-1.34)  (-1.17) 
Balanced budget               0.001 
requirement            (0.51) 
Coalition     -0.003  -0.001  -0.001*  -0.001*  -0.001* 
     (-1.44)  (-1.64)  (-1.69)  (-1.77)  (-1.70) 
Cabinet     0.001  0.001*  0.001*  0.001*  0.001* 
     (0.75)  (1.76)  (1.84)  (1.80)  (1.81) 
Leftshare     0.012  0.016**  0.012**  0.012**  0.011** 
     (0.58)  (2.21)  (2.27)  (2.30)  (1.97) 
Seats in parliament      -0.001 -0.0001** -0.0001**  -0.0001**  -0.0001**
     (-0.95)  (-2.07)  (-2.28)  (-2.25)  (-2.14) 
Number of communes      0.00004 0.00002  0.00002*  0.00002*  0.00002 
     (0.90)  (1.59)  (1.84)  (1.86)  (1.53) 
Unemployment 0.0006  0.0008  0.0004 0.0004  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002 
  (0.77) (0.85)  (0.61)  (1.57) (1.27)  (1.53)  (1.44) 
Urban -0.002  -0.002  0.007  -0.002 -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 









  (-1.75) (-1.73)  (-0.91)  (-1.01) (-1.08)  (-1.06)  (-1.05) 
Language            0.0002 
            (0.21) 
Observations  546  546 546 546 546  546  546 
Pseudo R2  0.315  0.317  0.334 0.381  0.397  0.399  0.400 
Observed P  0.031  0.031  0.031 0.031  0.031  0.031  0.031 
Predicted P  0.006  0.006  0.005 0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
Note: t-values are given in parentheses. ***,** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. t-
statistics are based on robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on cantons. For each independent variable we report 
marginal effects (dF/dx). The marginal effect indicates the marginal change in the probability of success for the average 
values of the independent variables. See Appendix A for a complete description of the variables.  
 
Table 5 displays the results of the empirical investigation for the whole time-series from 1981-
2001 for the Swiss cantons. In the first two columns we follow the basic procedure by Ardagna   – 18 –
(2004), Tavares (2004) and others to evaluate the impact of different economic and fiscal policy 
variables on the likelihood of a successful fiscal stabilization including some control variables. 
First, past economic growth has a negative and statistically significant impact on success. The 
result implies that problems of fiscal discipline are tackled more seriously in bad times than in 
years with prosperous economic development. However, business cycle fluctuations common to 
Switzerland do not seem to have any consequences on fiscal adjustments on the cantonal level. 
Again and in line with previous results, a high level of primary deficit in the past year strongly 
increases government’s likelihood to stabilize public finances. The same can be concluded by the 
stock of public debt that increases the chances of success even though the significance of the 
coefficient is much weaker than for the deficit coefficient. Thus, our results are similar to those 
obtained by von Hagen and Strauch (2001) for OECD countries arguing that the Maastricht 
Treaty fostered fiscal discipline in the European governments only to a very small extent at best.  
Turning to the composition of the fiscal adjustment, we get some additional interesting results. 
While an increase in tax revenues to fight fiscal imbalance does not contribute to a successful 
fiscal consolidation, spending cuts are more promising even though the coefficients turn insig-
nificant after including the institutional variables into the regression. The results correspond to 
the results obtained by Alesina and Perotti (1997) and Alesina and Ardagna (1998).  
The last variable in this group evaluates the effect of federal grants on the successful implemen-
tation of fiscal reform. Do federal grants help fiscal adjustments get launched und sustained by 
alleviating the short-term costs of such a reform? The results in Table 5 do not support such an 
interpretation. In fact, federal transfers significantly reduce the chance of successful consolida-
tions. A reasonable explanation might be that federal transfers do not only reduce the costs of 
fiscal adjustments for a cantonal government but also for doing nothing and delaying fiscal stabi-  – 19 –
lization. As can be seen by column 5, excluding the transfer variable from the regression does 
not alter the interpretation of the other regressors, so that a possible endogeneity bias does not 
seem to affect the qualitative interpretation of the results.  
Next we turn to the group of politico-institutional variables. First and most interestingly, fiscal 
decentralization increases the likelihood of successful fiscal adjustment significantly. Decentral-
ized governments are more committed for fiscal austerity packages in times of tight budgets than 
their centralist counterparts. The size of the coefficient indicates that for the median canton a 
one-percentage point increase in fiscal centralization reduces the likelihood of a successful ad-
justment by 0.03 percentage points for all 546 observations. The size of the coefficient rises to 
1.7 percentage points if we concentrate on the 62 episodes of tight fiscal policy only. Thus, our 
results do not support the idea that successful fiscal reforms need an institutional framework for 
autonomous leadership in which courageous incumbents can pursue austere fiscal policy deci-
sions. Centralist political systems with high policy discretion for incumbents do not support suc-
cessful fiscal stabilizations. On the contrary, decentralized governments seem to meet fiscal chal-
lenges adequately and successfully.  
Direct legislation is sometimes seen as another veto-player that may delay stabilization policies. 
However, our results do not support such an interpretation of the impact of direct democracy. 
There is no statistically significant negative impact of the fiscal referendum on the success of a 
fiscal adjustment. Similar results have been obtained by Küttel and Kugler (2003) also for Swiss 
cantons. This result follows from the logic of the fiscal referendum which allows citizens to veto 
spending projects above a specific spending threshold (Feld and Matsusaka 2003). It is thus an 
instrument to prevent spending increases, but does not enable citizens to induce spending reduc-
tions and start a fiscal adjustment process. As the fiscal referendum can hamper new spending, it   – 20 –
does not serve as a general veto instrument like the legislative referendum. If a government pro-
poses spending cuts, citizens cannot use a fiscal referendum to oppose them. It is thus no surprise 
that the fiscal referendum does not have a significant impact on fiscal consolidation.   
Roubini and Sachs (1989), Edin and Ohlsson (1991), Volkerink and de Haan (2000) and others 
argue that coalition cabinets tend to be fiscally less careful than single majority governments. 
Alesian and Drazen (1991) theoretically show that too many parties in government delay fiscal 
stabilizations, and Tavares (2004) and Mierau, Jon-A-Pin and de Haan (2005) empirically exam-
ine whether coalition governments have problems of successfully consolidating the budget. Very 
much in line with Tavares, we find some evidence indicating that coalition cabinets in fact have 
more difficulties in successfully implementing adjustment policies. However, the effect is very 
small in our case. Cabinet size does, in contrast to these results, not affect the likelihood of suc-
cess whereas the size of the parliament matters for fiscal adjustments. Thus, the effect of the type 
of government on fiscal discipline is different whether we look at public spending and public 
revenues or public deficits and fiscal adjustments (Schaltegger and Feld, 2004).  
Partisan concerns do not matter for success in the Swiss case. This is in contrast to the findings 
by Ardagna (2004), who provides evidence that left-wing cabinets are more successful in stabi-
lizing the budget, and by Mierau, Jon-A-Pin and de Haan (2005) who find the opposite impact 
According to Tavares (2004) the partisan impact of the cabinet is differentiated: fiscal adjust-
ment is more successful if right-wing governments raise taxes or if left-wing governments cut 
spending. Tavares argues that in doing so, governments can signal commitment to the fiscal ad-
justment since they undertake actions that are not favored by the majority of their constituency.  
The other control variables do not exhibit significant coefficients und thus have no impact on the 
likelihood of successful fiscal adjustments.    – 21 –
5.  Conclusions 
In this paper we draw attention to the politico-institutional aspect of successful fiscal adjust-
ments. In particular, we study whether fiscal decentralization reduces the ability of a government 
to consolidate budgets, or increases the credibility and accountability of mutually agreed fiscal 
consolidations. In theory, both outcomes seem plausible. On the one hand, fiscal decentralization 
increases the number of veto-players. This creates a status-quo bias when the political system 
tends to delay stabilization policies. On the other hand, fiscal decentralization strengthens fiscal 
discipline and fiscal equivalence thereby increasing the credibility of a long-lasting fiscal stabili-
zation. Fiscal decentralization works as a commitment device ensuring that proposed adjustment 
policies will not be quickly revised after or even during a gubernatorial term.  
The evidence favors that the latter interpretation. Fiscal decentralization increases the likelihood 
of successful budget stabilizations. Thus, centralist government institutions that increase the dis-
cretionary leeway of incumbents do not seem to foster long-lasting fiscal adjustments. In addi-
tion, the paper presents empirical evidence for the important role of grants-in-aid for subfederal 
governments. The estimated results indicate that federal transfer payments reduce the costs of 
fiscal adjustments thereby delaying the implementation of fiscal reforms.  
Another important result is that circumstances matter in which the fiscal adjustment takes place. 
Adjustments are more likely to be successful, if the deficits in previous years were high and 
GDP-growth was weak. This is a reasonable result implying that governments become active in 
bad times when there is need for fiscal reform. Concerning the composition of the fiscal adjust-
ment, spending cuts are more likely to favor long-lasting fiscal adjustments than revenue in-
creases. However, the level of significance is not always within a statistically secure interval.   – 22 –
Finally, coalition governments and large parliaments have more difficulties in implementing a 
successful fiscal adjustment than there counterparts.  
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Variable name  Description  Source 
ΔGDP (t-1)  Growth of real cantonal GDP per capita in the 
previous year 
BAK Basel Economics 
ΔGDP  
Switzerland (t-1) 
Average cantonal growth of real GDP per cap-
ita in the previous year 
BAK Basel Economics 
Primary balance (t-1)  Nominal primary balance per nominal GDP in 
the previous year 
Swiss Federal Finance Administration 
Debt (t-1)  Nominal cantonal debt per nominal GDP in the 
previous year 
Swiss Federal Finance Administration 
Δprimary spending  Change in nominal primary spending per nomi-
nal GDP  
Swiss Federal Finance Administration 
Δtax revenues  Change in nominal tax revenues per nominal 
GDP 
Swiss Federal Finance Administration 
Δtransfers Change  in  nominal  transfers received from the 
federal government per nominal GDP 
Swiss Federal Finance Administration 
Government  
Centralization 
Share of cantonal public spending from can-
tonal and local spending 
Swiss Federal Finance Administration 
Coalition  Number of parties in the cantonal cabinet  anneé politique suisse 
Cabinet   Number of ministers in the cantonal cabinet  anneé politique suisse 
Leftshare  Share of seat by left-wing parties in the can-
tonal parliament 
anneé politique suisse 
Seats parliament  Number of seats in the cantonal parliaments  anneé politique suisse 
Number of com-
munes 
Number of communes in a canton  Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
Unemployment Rate  Share of unemployment on the cantonal popu-
lation 
Own calculations on the basis of Swiss 
Federal Statistical Office 
Urban  Proportion of local communities having more 
than 10’000 inhabitants.  
Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
Population  Cantonal population (logarithmized in the 
estimations) 
Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
German Language  Share of German Speaking population   Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
Balanced budget 
requirement 
Dummy = 1 for cantons having a formal fiscal 
restraint for a given year 
Own calculations on the basis of Stauffer 
(2001) and Stalder (2005) 
Fiscal referendum  Dummy = 1 for cantons allowing for manda-
tory budget referendum multiplied with the 
inverse of the financial threshold that qualifies 
for the ballot 
Own calculations on the basis of data from 
Trechsel and Serdült (1999) and C2D-
Database 
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Appendix B 
Descriptive statistics  
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Success 0.031 0.174 0 1 
ΔGDP (t-1)  0.007 0.024 -0.091 0.073 
ΔGDP Switzerland (t-1)  0.009 0.016 -0.016 0.036 
Primary balance (t-1)  0.007 0.012 -0.053 0.078 
Debt (t-1)  0.129 0.057 0.019 0.395 
Δprimary spending  0.003 0.011 -0.044 0.056 
Δtax revenues  -0.002 0.005 -0.051 0.045 
Δtransfers  0.0002 0.003 -0.014 0.013 
Centralization  0.673 0.106 0.510 0.996 
Coalition  3.286 0.871 1 5 
Cabinet  6.381 1.208 5 9 
Leftshare  0.218 0.129 0 0.531 
Seats in parliament  115.0 47.5 46 200 
Number of communes  114.9 113.6 3 412 
Unemployment  0.018 0.018 0 0.078 
Urban  0.324 0.249 0 0.995 
Population  261938 272497 12781 1228628 
German Language  0.714 0.353 0.050 0.980 
Balanced budget requirement  0.106 0.308 1 0 
Fiscal referendum (DummyXThreshold
-1)  1.794 4.844 0 29.328 
Notes: For a detailed description of the variables see Appendix A. All statistics are computed for 546 
observations. CESifo Working Paper Series 




1884 Johannes Becker and Clemens Fuest, Corporate Tax Policy and International Mergers 
and Acquisitions – Is the Tax Exemption System Superior?, January 2007 
 
1885 Momi Dahan and Udi Nisan, The Effect of Benefits Level on Take-up Rates: Evidence 
from a Natural Experiment, January 2007 
 
1886 José García-Solanes, Francisco I. Sancho-Portero and Fernando Torrejón-Flores, 
Beyond the Salassa-Samuelson Effect in some New Member States of the European 
Union, January 2007 
 
1887 Peter Egger, Wolfgang Eggert and Hannes Winner, Saving Taxes Through Foreign 
Plant Ownership, January 2007 
 
1888 Timothy J. Goodspeed and Andrew Haughwout, On the Optimal Design of Disaster 
Insurance in a Federation, January 2007 
 
1889 Wim Groot, Henriëtte Maassen van den Brink and Bernard van Praag, The 
Compensating Income Variation of Social Capital, January 2007 
 
1890 Bas Jacobs, Ruud A. de Mooij and Kees Folmer, Analyzing a Flat Income Tax in the 
Netherlands, January 2007 
 
1891 Hans Jarle Kind, Guttorm Schjelderup and Frank Stähler, Newspapers and Advertising: 
The Effects of Ad-Valorem Taxation under Duopoly, January 2007 
 
1892 Erkki Koskela and Rune Stenbacka, Equilibrium Unemployment with Outsourcing 
under Labour Market Imperfections, January 2007 
 
1893 Maarten Bosker, Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen, Herman de Jong and Marc 
Schramm, The Development of Cities in Italy 1300 – 1861, January 2007 
 
1894 Michel Beine, Oscar Bernal, Jean-Yves Gnabo and Christelle Lecourt, Intervention 
Policy of the BoJ: A Unified Approach, January 2007 
 
1895 Robert S. Chirinko and Daniel J. Wilson, State Investment Tax Incentives: A Zero-Sum 
Game?, January 2007 
 
1896 Theo S. Eicher and Oliver Roehn, Sources of the German Productivity Demise – 
Tracing the Effects of Industry-Level ICT Investment, January 2007 
 
1897 Helge Berger, Volker Nitsch and Tonny Lybek, Central Bank Boards around the World: 
Why does Membership Size Differ?, January 2007 
 
1898 Gabriel Felbermayr and Wilhelm Kohler, Does WTO Membership Make a Difference at 
the Extensive Margin of World Trade?, January 2007  
1899 Benno Torgler and Friedrich Schneider, The Impact of Tax Morale and Institutional 
Quality on the Shadow Economy, January 2007 
 
1900 Tomer Blumkin and Efraim Sadka, On the Desirability of Taxing Charitable 
Contributions, January 2007 
 
1901 Frederick van der Ploeg and Reinhilde Veugelers, Higher Education Reform and the 
Renewed Lisbon Strategy: Role of Member States and the European Commission, 
January 2007 
 
1902 John Lewis, Hitting and Hoping? Meeting the Exchange Rate and Inflation Criteria 
during a Period of Nominal Convergence, January 2007 
 
1903 Torben M. Andersen, The Scandinavian Model – Prospects and Challenges, January 
2007 
 
1904 Stephane Dees, Sean Holly, M. Hashem Pesaran and L. Vanessa Smith, Long Run 
Macroeconomic Relations in the Global Economy, January 2007 
 
1905 Richard Jong-A-Pin and Jakob De Haan, Political Regime Change, Economic Reform 
and Growth Accelerations, January 2007 
 
1906 Sascha O. Becker and Peter H. Egger, Endogenous Product versus Process Innovation 
and a Firm’s Propensity to Export, February 2007 
 
1907 Theo S. Eicher, Chris Papageorgiou and Oliver Roehn, Unraveling the Fortunates of the 
Fortunate: An Iterative Bayesian Model Averaging (IBMA) Approach, February 2007 
 
1908 Liliana E. Pezzin, Robert A. Pollak and Barbara S. Schone, Efficiency in Family 
Bargaining: Living Arrangements and Caregiving Decisions of Adult Children and 
Disabled Elderly Parents, February 2007 
 
1909 Christian Keuschnigg and Soren Bo Nielsen, Self-Selection and Advice in Venture 
Capital Finance, February 2007 
 
1910 Rune Jansen Hagen and Gaute Torsvik, Irreversible Investments, Dynamic 
Inconsistency and Policy Convergence, February 2007 
 
1911 Eric A. Hanushek and Ludger Woessmann, The Role of School Improvement in 
Economic Development, February 2007 
 
1912 Bernard M. S. van Praag, Perspectives from the Happiness Literature and the Role of 
New Instruments for Policy Analysis, February 2007 
 
1913 Volker Grossmann and Thomas M. Steger, Growth, Development, and Technological 
Change, February 2007 
 
1914 Margarita Katsimi and Thomas Moutos, Human Capital and the Feldstein-Horioka 
Puzzle, February 2007 
  
1915 Oliver Roehn, Theo S. Eicher and Thomas Strobel, The Ifo Industry Growth 
Accounting Database, February 2007 
 
1916 Ian Babetskii, Aggregate Wage Flexibility in Selected New EU Member States, 
February 2007 
 
1917 Burkhard Heer, Alfred Maussner and Paul D. McNelis, The Money-Age Distribution: 
Empirical Facts and Limited Monetary Models, February 2007 
 
1918 Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie D. Chinn and Eijii Fujii, The Overvaluation of Renminbi 
Undervaluation, February 2007 
 
1919 Jim Malley, Apostolis Philippopoulos and Ulrich Woitek, To React or Not? Fiscal 
Policy, Volatility and Welfare in the EU-3, February 2007 
 
1920 Mattias Polborn, Competing for Recognition through Public Good Provision, February 
2007 
 
1921 Lars P. Feld and Benno Torgler, Tax Morale after the Reunification of Germany: 
Results from a Quasi-Natural Experiment, February 2007 
 
1922 Robert S. Chirinko and Huntley Schaller, Fundamentals, Misvaluation, and Investment: 
The Real Story, February 2007 
 
1923 Benno Torgler and Friedrich Schneider, Shadow Economy, Tax Morale, Governance 
and Institutional Quality: A Panel Analysis, February 2007 
 
1924 Adrian Pagan and M. Hashem Pesaran, On Econometric Analysis of Structural Systems 
with Permanent and Transitory Shocks and Exogenous Variables, February 2007 
 
1925 Hans-Werner Sinn, The Welfare State and the Forces of Globalization, February 2007 
 
1926 Michael Smart, Raising Taxes through Equalization, February 2007 
 
1927 Øystein Foros, Kåre P. Hagen and Hans Jarle Kind, Price-Dependent Profit Sharing as 
an Escape from the Bertrand Paradox, February 2007 
 
1928 Balázs Égert, Kirsten Lommatzsch and Amina Lahrèche-Révil, Real Exchange Rates in 
Small Open OECD and Transition Economies: Comparing Apples with Oranges?, 
February 2007 
 
1929 Aleksander Berentsen and Cyril Monnet, Monetary Policy in a Channel System, 
February 2007 
 
1930 Wolfgang Ochel, The Free Movement of Inactive Citizens in the EU – A Challenge for 
the European Welfare State?, February 2007 
 
1931 James K. Hammitt and Nicolas Treich, Statistical vs. Identified Lives in Benefit-Cost 
Analysis, February 2007 
  
1932 Wilhelm Kohler, The Bazaar Effect, Unbundling of Comparative Advantage, and 
Migration, February 2007 
 
1933 Karsten Staehr, Fiscal Policies and Business Cycles in an Enlarged Euro Area, February 
2007 
 
1934 Michele Bernasconi and Paola Profeta, Redistribution or Education? The Political 
Economy of the Social Race, March 2007 
 
1935 Axel Dreher, Martin Gassebner and Lars-H. R. Siemers, Does Terror Threaten Human 
Rights? Evidence from Panel Data, March 2007 
 
1936 Naércio Aquino Menezes Filho and Marc-Andreas Muendler, Labor Reallocation in 
Response to Trade Reform, March 2007 
 
1937 Gebhard Flaig and Timo Wollmershaeuser, Does the Euro-zone Diverge? A Stress 
Indicator for Analyzing Trends and Cycles in Real GDP and Inflation, March 2007 
 
1938 Michael Funke and Michael Paetz, Environmental Policy Under Model Uncertainty: A 
Robust Optimal Control Approach, March 2007 
 
1939 Byeongchan Seong, Sung K. Ahn and Peter A. Zadrozny, Cointegration Analysis with 
Mixed-Frequency Data, March 2007 
 
1940 Monika Bütler and Michel André Maréchal, Framing Effects in Political Decision 
Making: Evidence from a Natural Voting Experiment, March 2007 
 
1941 Giacomo Corneo and Olivier Jeanne, A Theory of Tolerance, March 2007 
 
1942 Qing Hong and Michael Smart, In Praise of Tax Havens: International Tax Planning and 
Foreign Direct Investment, March 2007 
 
1943 Yin-Wong Cheung, Dickson Tam and Matthew S. Yiu, Does the Chinese Interest Rate 
Follow the US Interest Rate?, March 2007 
 
1944 Panu Poutvaara and Mikael Priks, Unemployment and Gang Crime: Could Prosperity 
Backfire?, March 2007 
 
1945 Burkhard Heer, On the Modeling of the Income Distribution Business Cycle Dynamics, 
March 2007 
 
1946 Christoph A. Schaltegger and Lars P. Feld, Are Fiscal Adjustments less Successful in 
Decentralized Governments?, March 2007 